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Das Wertfreiheitsproblem und die Holzwege des Positivismusstreits

PAITLOVÁ, J. Das Wertfreiheitsproblem und die Holzwege des Positivismusstreits. Aufklärung und Kritik, 2019, roč. 26, č. 3, s. 7-19. ISSN: 0945-6627
Jazyk publikace: ger
Anglický název: The Value Free Problem and the Snags of the Positivism Dispute
Rok vydání: 2019
Autoři: Mgr. Jitka Paitlová Ph.D. ,
Abstrakt EN: The philosophical question about the normative content of our descriptive insights has already been asked by David Hume: Can one conclude from "may" to "ought"? Hume formulated the so-called Humean law, which states that one can not logically derive normative judgments from descriptive statements. This law thus rejects the transition from descriptive to normative statements by purely logical derivations. In the twentieth century, there were two specific disputes about values ​​in the social sciences in the German-speaking philosophical milieu: the value-judgment dispute and the positivism dispute. This essay tries to decipher this puzzlement by ideas of Karl Popper and Hans Albert.
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